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aRSTRACT
Statistical and probabilistic reliability methodologies
are developed for the determination of hardware life limits
for the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME). Both methodolo-
gies require that a mathematical reliability model of the
engine (system) _ .... _ " - .......per_,, an_e be dev =l_n_- _ R fnncrion of
the reliabilities of the components and parts. The system
reliability model should be developed from the Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List. The statis-
tlcal reliability methodology establishes hardware life
limits directly from the failure distributions of the
components and parts obtained from statistically-designed
testing. The probabiiistic reliability methodology estab-
lishes hardware llfe limits from a decision analysis
methodology which incorporates the component/part reiia-
biiities obtained from a probabilisric structural analysis,
a calibrated maintenance program, inspection techniques, and
fabrication procedures. Probabi!istic structural analysis
is recommended as a tool to pri0ritize upgrading of the
components and parts.
The Weibull probability distribution is presently
being investigated by NASA/MSFC to characterize the failure
distribution of the SSME hardware from a limited data base
of failures. Methods are outlined to derive a file of
values of the shape parameter 8 of the Weibull distribution
(i.e., "B-bank") from failure data obtained for hardware on
the SSME and other pump-propelled rocket engines, from
material specimen testing, from probabilistic structural
analysis, and from expert judgment.
Other recommendations include the development of
concise definitions and identification measures of the
mechanical failure modes of the hardware in the failure data
collection process to facilitate statistical failure data
analysis, the calibration of failure distributions derived
from probabillstic structural analyses with the failure
distributions derived statistically from testing, and the
development of a decision analysis methodology to determine
hardware life limits when limited failure data is available.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
OF POOR QUALITY
During the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo-Saturn programs,
NASA developed rocket propulsion systems with high reliabi-
lity since most were expendable and maintenance could not be
performed. Since the 1970's, however, NASA has been
challenged with the development of the reusable Space
Snuttie Main Engine (SSME) _o be designed for 55 Shu_ie
Orbiter launches, which is 27,000 seconds of operating life.
In launch, the three Orbiter SSMEs operate in parallel with
the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) for approximately 2 minutes
until SRB separation. The SSMEs then continue to burn for a
total of about 8 minutes from launch until the Orbiter is
near the desired orbital velocity.
The SSME is a high performance, liquid propellant
rocket engine with variable thrust. The SSMEs use liquid
oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellants, which are stored in
the External Tank attached to the Orbiter, and operate at a
mixture ratio (LOX/LH2) of 6:1. Each SSME uses a staged
combustion cycle to power the turbopumps with high combu-
stion chamber pressure. First, the staged combustion
cycle consists of partial propellant combustion in the
preburners at high pressure and relatively low temperature.
The propellants are then totally combusted at a high
chamber pressure of approximately 3000 psia and a high
temperature in the main combustion chamber (MCC) before
expanding through the nozzle which has an area ratio of
77.5:1.
Each SSME produces 470,000 ibs. of thrust at rated
power level (RPL) and is throttieable from 65 percent RPL to
109 percent, which is full power level (FPL) and 512,000
ibs. of thrust. The SSMEs are designed, fabricated,
and maintained by Rockwell Internationai/Rocketdyne Division
(RI/RD) for NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC).
Further descriptlons and performance of the SSMEs can be
found in Schwinghamer (1976), Johnson and Colbo (1981),
Kiatt and Wheelock (1982), McCarty and Wood (1983), and
Ryan et al., (1983). To date, the SSMEs have collectively
acquired approximately 38,000 seconds of operation !n 25
launches and a total of 270,000 seconds of combined test and
launch time.
2.0 PROBLEM STATEMENT
The reusability requirement with minimum maintenance
for quick turn-around time, the high operating temperatures
and pressures, and the limited Congressional fund!ng for the
Space Shuttle program provide the major engineering chal-
lenges for the design, fabrication, and maintenance of a
highly reliable SSME. For reliability and maintainability,
the SSME can be considered as a system composed of a number
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of components and parts as shown in Figure 1. The terms
"system", "components", and "parts" will be used throughout
this paper and are defined as follows:
System: Group of components integrated
to perform specific opera-
tional function(s).
EXAMPLE: SSME
Component:
(Subsystem)
Collection of parts which repre-
sents a self-contained entity of
a complete system and perform a
function necessary to the operation
of that system.
EXAMPLES: High Pressure Fuel Turbopump
(HPFTP)
Main Combustion Chamber (MCC)
Main Fuel Valve (MFV)
Part: Least subdivision of a component which
cannot be disassembled without destroying
it.
EXAMPLE: HPFTP: Blades, Impellers, Seals,
Bearings, Welds, etc.
RI/RD (1984) illustrates the SSME engine, component, and
part configurations and gives the acronyms for the hardware
used An this paper. A number of components such as the four
turbopumps (LPFTP, HPFTP, LPOTP, and HPOTP), valves, ducts,
instrumentation, igniters, nozzles, and con%toilers have
been designed as line replaceable units (LRUs) to facilitate
field maintenance, automatic checkout, and internal inspec-
tion capabilities. A number of the SSME components/parts
are life-limited due to low-cycle (LC)/thermal fatigue,
high-cycle fatigue (HCF), and cyclic creep. One of the
ma_or SSME challenges to date is the quantification of
reliable life limits for the SSME hardware.
Reliable life limits for engine parts are established
by the aircraft industry from sufficient testing of the
components and parts. The aircraft industry develops an
engine using the "bottom-up" approach (e.g., Hill, 1977;
Gibson, 1985). Extensive testing and redesign is done at
the component/part level during the developmental phase of
the englne to verify component/part reliability. From
adequate testing of the parts and components, the proba-
bility distribution of the time (or number of cycles) to
failure of each life-limited hardware is developed. The
hardware life limit is then determined from the failure
distribution to achieve a given reliability level. With
this approach, "surprise" failures and redesign problems are
xxxv- 2
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minimized during engine level testing and the operational
phase• The reliability of the components, parts, and hence,
the engine, is well-understood.
The SSME, however, has been developed using the
"top-down" approach. The SSME has been designed, fabricated
and launched with relatively little developmental testing
of the materials, components, and parts. Because of
Congressional budgetary restraints, virtually all testing
has been/is being conducted at the engine (system) level•
This approach for engine development has caused several
significant engineering problems in quantifying life utili-
zation of the SSME hardware:
I • Because component/part level testing has not been
conducted on the SSME, the reliability of the SSME
hardware and the life limits cannot be quantified
statistically from the failure data. For most life-
limited hardware, none to only a few failures have been
observed. Generally, no life-limited component or part
is used in flight if it has accumulated time greater
than 50% of the fleet leader time of that hardware.
What procedure should be used to establish reliable
utilization of life-limited SSME hardware?
• During engine level testing and flight, 26 significant
SSME failures have occurred due to a variety of
different component/part failures (Vance, 1986).
Fifteen of these failures occurred prior to the first
launch of the SSMEs on the Shuttle Orbiter Columbia on
April 12, 1981. Preliminary Flight Certification
(PFC) and Full Power Level Certification (FPLC) are
based on accumulating 10,000 seconds on each of two
engines for a 10-f!ight capacity to provide a safety
factor of 2. Is engine testing sufficient to prevent
the random occurrence of future SSME failures?
• The SSME has been designed using the factor of safety
(FS) approach with the following values for the FS
(RI/RD, 1974):
• 1.5 for ultimate, pressure only
• 1.4 for ultimate, combined loads
• 1.1 for yield
• 4.0 for LCF
• 10.0 for HCF
• 10.0 for creep
The FS concept, however, does not measure the reliabi-
lity or failure probability and does not quantify the
uncertainty associated with the SSME design parameters.
The uncertainty associated with the SSME design
parameters can be divided into statistical and
nonstatistical uncertainties as follows:
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• Statistical uncertainty (can be quantified from
data)
• Operating environment
• Thermal environment
• Pressure
• Other design loads
• Material properties
• Ultimate, tensile strength
• Compressive strength
• S-N fatigue curves
• Fracture-related properties
• Dimensions (tolerances)
• Inspection procedures
• Nonstatistical uncertainty (associated with the
assumptions and thermal/stress/fatigue models
used in the structural analyses)
How can the above uncertainties be incorporated into a
methodology to reliably establish life limits for the
SSME hardware?
3.0 OBJECTIVE
This paper proposes that SSME hardware life utilization
should be established from a reliability methodology rather
than from a factor of safety approach. From a reliability
approach, the SSME hardware life limits should be determined
from the reliabilities of the parts and components, R
D
and R , resDectiveiy. Two reliability methodologies are
C . -- .
presentea in thls paper:
1. A statistical reliability methodology
(Quantitative reliabilities are calculated)
2. A probabilistic reliability methodology
(Qualitative reliabilities are calculated)
Figures 2 and 3 outline the statistical and probabilistic
reliability methodologies, respectively. Both reliability
approaches require that a mathematical reliability model of
the engine (system) be developed as a function of the
reliabilities of the parts and components. The two methodo-
logies differ in the procedure which is used to develop the
reiiabilitles of the components and parts and to establish
hardware life limits.
The advantages and disadvantages of both methodologies
are outlined in Table 1. The application of each methodo-
logy to establish SSME hardware life limits depends on the
available data and on the objective of the reliability
analysis. If the objective is to quantify the hardware life
limits to maintain a specified hardware reliability, then
the statistical approach should be used. On the other hand,
if limited failure data is available, then a Drobabilistic
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reliability methodology should be utilized as a tool to
establish hardware life limits from a cost-benefit analysis
which considers the design parameters uncertainties,
maintenance program, inspection techniques, and fabrica-
tion procedures.
in the statistical reliability methodology outlined in
Figure 2, the SSME hardware life limits are determined from
the apportioneU reiiaDiii_ies R and R required Lo achleve
the desired SSME _arget reliability _ c The reau!red
reiiabiiities R and R are verified during the develoo-
"D c. -
mental phase of-the englne from statistically-designed
testing. From sufficient testing at the part and component
levels, the probability distribution of the time (or number
of cycles) to failure of each life-limited part or component
is developed. The hardware life limit is then established
from the failure distribution corresponding to the desired
reliability for that hardware. Hence this methodology gives
a meaningful, quantitative assessment of the reiiabiiities
of the parts, components, and hence, the SSME.
A probabilistic reliability methodology qualita-
tively, rather than quantitatively, assesses the reiiabiii-
ties of the parts, components, and engine. The reliabi!i-
ties of the SSME hardware are determined qualitatively from
probabilistic structural analyses of the failure phenomenon
which incorporates the uncertainty in the design parameters
listed in Section 2. The reliability numbers genera-
ted from this method do not have quantitative meaning except
for hardware where the theoretical failure distribution is
benchmarked by the failure distribution developed from
testing. In lieu of reiiabiiities quantified from testing,
probabiiistic assessement of the part/component reliabiii-
ties does give the relative reliab±iities of the SSME
hardware given the uncertainty in the respective design
parameters. Consequently, the probabilistic structural
analysis becomes one of several tools needed for a decision
analysis process to quantify SSME hardware life limits as
discussed in Section 6.
This paper addresses the following aspects of these two
methodologies:
• SSME system reliability
• SSME component/part reliabilities
• Statistical component/part reiiabilities
• Probabilistic component/part reliabilities
• Decision analysis methodology
4.0 SSME SYSTEM RELIABILITY
The performance of the SSME should be represented by a
mathematical reliability model of the engine which sub-
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divides the SSME into lower levels of components and parts,
including identification of the interfaces/interactions
among the components and parts which affect the engine
reliability. System or SSME reliability, R_, is apportioned
down to the level of .component and part rellabilities, R
and Rp, respectively, c
For the SSME, the logical starting point to develop the
system performance model is the Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) document prepared by
RI/RD (1984). This document identifies the potential
hardware failures, their effects on engine and vehicle
performance, and their ranking according to a criticality
category. A Criticality Category 1 failure, the most
serious, results in loss of life or vehicle (including loss
or injury to the public). The mathematical reliability
model of engine performance should be initially developed
for all Criticality Category 1 failures identified in the
FMEA/CIL for each mission operational phase: propellant
conditioning, engine start, mainstage, cutoff, and post-
cutoff. However, further development of the FMEA/CIL report
would be required since the mechanical failure modes,
causes of failure, and failure rates (failure distributions)
of the SSME hardware leading to Criticality Category 1
failures has not been adequately developed in this document.
The mechanical failure modes of the SSME parts of each
component should be separated into a failure mode matrix of
age-related and non-age-related failure modes as shown in
Table 2.
A system reliability model of the SSME is proposed to
facilitate hardware life utilization as follows:
• To provide, in a logical and illustrative manner, a
thorough understanding of the complex interrela-
tionships of all failure modes which could initiate
SSME failure.
• To provide a methodology to identify the sensitivity
of SSME performance to different failure modes and
designs.
• To provide a mathematical tool to apportion and
determine the reliabilities of the components/parts
from which the hardware life can be determined.
• To prioritize upgrading of the component/part reiiabi-
lities.
Mathematical reliability models of a system include
event trees, fault trees (or conversely, success trees),
and reliability block diagrams. Conceptual, partial
fault tree and reliability block diagrams which model SSME
system performance are shown in Figures 4 and 5, respective-
ly. The fault tree would be the logical continuation of the
FMEA/CIL study and should be developed initially for all
Criticality Category 1 failures as assessed in the FMEA/CIL.
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Fault tree analysis is a powerful tool to understand a
complex system such as the SSME. In 1961, fault tree
analysis was originated by H.A. Watson of Beii Telephone
Laboratories to evaluate the safety of the Minuteman Launch
Control System. Fault tree analysis is a deductive method-
ology to determine the "basic events" (faults or failure
modes) which could propagate to result in the undesired
"top event", the failure of the SSME. Basic events, such
as turbine blade failure, which could lead to a Criticality
Category 1 failure, are represented by circles in Figure 4.
Basic events have failure probabilities (distributions)
assigned to them and hence represent the component/part
failure probabilities (or conversely, reiiabilities).
Quantitative analysis of the fault tree calculates the
probability of the top event occurring from failure informa-
tion of the basic events. In addition, quantitative fault
tree analysis can be used to determine the required reiiabi-
lities of the components and parts from the target SSME
reliability R_, which can be used to assess the hardware
life limits or the SSME. Assessment of the reliabiiities of
the components and parts is discussed below.
5.0 SSME COMPONENT/PART RELIABILITIES
The most feasible approach to establish the reliability
of a mechanical component is to break it down into the
individual parts which can fail. The effect of each
operational and physical uncertainty on these parts can then
be determined to establish the mechanical failure mode(s) of
each part. The component reliability is then a function of
the reliabillties of the individual parts. In general
terms, a basic mechanical failure mode can be defined as the
physical process(es) which occur or combine their effects to
alter the size, shape, or material properties of SSME
hardware to make it incapable of satisfactorily performing
its intended functions. Examples of mechanical failure
modes include LCF, HCF, wear, cyclic creep, buckling, etc.
If the mechanical failure modes, failure rates, and hence,
reliabillties, of the parts are known, then the component
reliability can be determined (Raze, Nelson, and Simard,
1986).
As an illustrative example, consider that a valve
assembly may fail due to only two failure modes: seal
leakage (caused by wear) and a cracked connector/housing
(caused by fatigue). If R represents the reliability of
5 - o .
the seal and R h represents the reliaD11ity of the housing,
then the reliability of the valve, R v is given as:
R v = R s x R h (i)
Because the SSME has little mechanical redundancy, generally
the reliability of the parts should be greater than the
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reliability of the components, which inturn should be more
reliable than the engine.
The cumulative Weibuil probability distribution
(Weibull, 1951) has been utilized by the aircraft engine
industry (e.g., Abernethy et al., 1983b) to characterize
the probability distribution of the time (or number of
cycles) to failure of a number of mechanical failure modes
of engine hardware. Table 3 presents preliminary documenta-
tion of the use of the Weibull probability distribution to
characterize the failure distributions of engine hardware
and more generally, of mechanical failure modes such as
LCF, HCF, wear, etc. The Weibull distribution is presently
being implemented at NASA/MSFC to develop the failure
distributions of SSME hardware from a limited data base
of failures (Leath, 1986). Because reliability literature
contains numerous references on the theory of the Weibull
distribution, the establishment of confidence intervals,
etc., only the engineering significance of the Weibuii
distribution will be discussed below.
The cumulative two-parameter Welbull probability
function, FT(t), of the random variable T representing the
life (in time or number of cycles) to failure of an engine
component or part is given as:
t s]FT(t) = i - exp[-(_) (2)
where
8 = Weibull shape parameter
n = Weibull scale parameter (characteristic life)
When the failure data is graphed on Weibull probability
plot paper, the shape parameter 8 is the slope of the
straight line fitted to the data and represents the failure
rate of the hardware. In general, the Weibull shape
parameter (or slope) B for the different parts comprising a
given component will not be equal. Therefore, the compo-
nent, or valve, reliability distribution R (or conversely,
the failure distribution) in equation (1) Hill not be a
Weibuli distribution, i.e., the distribution expressing R
v
will not plot as a straight line on Weibull paper. The
importance of the Welbull shape parameter 8 in characteri-
zing component/part reliability is addressed below.
The mean, or expected value, E(T), of the Weibuii
distribution is given as:
1
E(T) = n F[1 + _ ] (3)
where F[ 3 is the complete Gamma function. The coefficient
xxxv- 8
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of variation, w, of the Weibui! distribution is. given as:
F[1 + 2/B] - 1] 1/2 (4)
Y = IF2[1 + I/8]
Note that ¥ is dependent only on the Weibuli shape parameter 8
and is independent of _. The relationship between B and w
in Equation (4) is graphed in Figure 6. As the value of
B increases, ¥ decreases. Therefore, overestimation of B
implies a smaller value of ¥ or "more certainty" in the
failure mode process. If the coefficient of variation of a
given failure mode is known, then 8 can be derived from
equation (4).
For a hardware llfe limit t_ corresponding to a
cumulative probability of failur_ F_(%) equal to p_,
Equation (2) can be solved for tD a_ follows:
tD = n (in 1 ]I/B (5)
(I - pF)
Then the factor of safety (FS) for the mean life E[T] of the
Weibull distribution can be solved from Equations (3) and
(5) as:
Factor of Safety = FS -
E(T) (6)
t D
The FS will be a function of only _ (or ¥) and D F. The
relationship between p_, FS, and B (or ¥) is graphed in
Figure 7. The followihg _rends noted in Figure 7 illustrate
the sensitivity of PF and FS to the estimate of 8 when per-
forming Weibull analysis:
e
e
For a given 8, PF decreases as FS increases.
(A higher FS gives a lower pF ) .
For a given FS, _ decreases as B increases.(Overestimation B gives an unconservative
estimate (too low) estimate of pF ).
For example, if the Weibull distribution for a LCF failure
mode of a specific SSME hardware has a shape parameter B of
3, then the design lives selected to limit p_ to 0.01 and
0.001 would correspond to values of the FS oT about 4 and 9,
respectively.
In order to maintain a given PF (or target reliability)
of a specific hardware, the effect of 8 on the design
life t n is illustrated in Figure 8. Consider the case of
overestimation B for values of PF less than 0.632. For
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examDle, for a D_ of 0.001, for a value of S equal to 2,
the ratio of tn/_ is euual to 0.1. However, if B is
overestimated _o be 2.5, then tD/_ would be equal to 0.25,
which would imply a design life of 2-1/2 times greater than
the actual value. Consequently, an accurate estimate
of the Weibull shape parameter B is important to realisti-
cally quantify the reliability of a component or part.
For values of PF less than 0.632, it is conservative
therefore to use an underestimated (smaller) value of 8.
Methods to develop a file of values of the Weibuii
shape parameter 8 to assess component/part reliabilities
for the SSME hardware are outlined in Table 4. The first
method determines values of 8, and hence, hardware reliabi-
lities, from failure data of the SSME or other pump-propel-
led liquid rocket engines. The second method establishes
value of 8 from data obtained from material specimen
testing. The third method determines values of 8 theoreti-
cally from probabilistic structural analyses of the failure
phenomenon of the hardware. Finally, the fourth method uses
values of 8 determined from expert judgment. For example,
for some components it may be conservative to use a value of 8
equal to one, which implies that the failure distribution
follows an exponential distribution and the failure rate is
constant. The first and third methodologies are discussed
below.
5.1 STATISTICAL COMPONENT/PART RELIABILITIES
If considerable testing is performed at the component/
part level, then the probability distribution of the time
(or number of cycles) to failure of a component or part, and
hence 8, can be determined directly from statistical
analysis of the failure data (method 1 in Table 4). The
component or part can then be utilized for an operating life
corresponding to the required level of reliability for that
particular hardware as illustrated in Figure 2. This
approach enables meaningful, absolute reliability values to
be utilized in a quantitative reliability methodology.
As failures of SSME hardware are observed in testing
or flight, a file of values of the Weibul! shape parameter
8 ("8-bank") for different observed failure modes, ma-
terials, and parts should be developed from the failure
data. To provide consistency between the failure data and
the structural analysis of a given failure mode, the
mechanical failure modes (wear, fatigue, etc.) leading to
SSME Criticality Category 1 failures should be identified in
matrix form as in Table 2. Descriptive measures (inspection
procedures) and verification methods of each failure mode
should be incorporated into the failure data collection
process to facilitate correct statistical analysis of the
failure data. Much of the scatter observed in failure data
plotted on Weibull paper is due to the mixing of the differ-
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ent mechanical failure modes. Consequently, the data for
the different failure modes of a given hardware must be
properly separated by physical inspection and classification
before the statistical analysis of the failure data can be
performed.
Therefore, the statistical treatment of the SSME
failure data should involve the following steps:
• Develop a concise definition of each failure mode.
• Develop a descriptive measure of each failure mode
for maintenance and inspection purposes.
• Monitor the estimates of n, B, and the desired
B-lives as the number of failures increases.
• Monitor the reliability growth as the number
of failures increases.
• Document and verify the Weibull analysis computer
programs and theory.
• Document the appropriateness/procedure of
performing Weibayes/Weibest analysis per.
Abernethy, et ai., (1983). For example, what
are appropriate values of B?
In addition, to complement the limited failure data on
SSME hardware, values of B should be established from
similar hardware on other pump-propelled rocket engines as
recommended in method lb in Table 4. Per MacGregor (1982),
RI/RD has obtained about 85,000 Unsatisfactory Condition
Reports (UCRs) over the past 30 years from the development
of eight different pump-propelled rocket engines (including
the SSME), the delivery of about 2500 engines, and the
launch of over 1000 flight vehicles. From consideration of
failures which have occurred only during the operational
(mature) phase of these engines, RI/RD has identified at
least 13 common failure modes as listed in Table 5. It is
recommended that these failure modes be further investigated
to develop a file of B values to complement the values of 8
developed from the limited SSME failure data. It is also
recommended that RI/RD's data base of UCRs be investigated
to derive values of 8 for failure modes in addition to those
identified by MacGregor (1982).
The use of failure data from other pump-propelled
rocket engines must also address the possibility of varia-
tion of the value of B (the failure rate) from engine-to-
engine. Such variations may be due to hardware design
differences, overall engine design variations, and variabil-
ity in operating environments. For failure modes of
similar hardware on different engines where sufficient
failure data is available, the hypothesis of engine-to-
engine variability should be tested. However, the use of
historical failure data from similar hardware of other
engines may lead to more reasonable hardware life assess-
ments than assuming, for example, a constant failure rate
ORIGINAL PAGE
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for all hardware. In addition, the values of B derived
from the historical data may also be incorporated in the
Bayesian analysis of hardware re!iabiiities being imple-
mented by JPL (1986).
5.2 p_R_OBABILIST!Q_COMp_ONENT/PART RELIABILITIES
Development of the component and part reliabi!ities
from a probabilistic structural analysis (method 3 in Table
4) involves the following steps:
• Identify all the design parameters which have
uncertainty associated with them.
• Collect data on the variabilities of the design
parameters.
• Model the probability distributions of the design
parameters.
• Perform the probabilistic structural analysis by
propagating these distributions through the
mathematical model of the failure phenomena.
• Model the probability (e.g. Weibuil) distribution
of hardware life.
The reliability of a given hardware is a function of
the N random design variables representing the variabilities
in the material, load, and structural parameters. Let X =
.'"1[ "'2 ....... N' _- - " =-
naraware. The _erro_mance function g(X) of the hardware
for a given failure mode can be expressed as
g(_) = g(Xl, X 2 .... , XN) (7)
The limit state, or the boundary of the failure domain, of
the hardware may then be defined as
g(R) = 0 (8)
Hence,
g(X) > 0 is the "safe state" (9)
g(X) 4 0 is the "failure state" (i0)
A typical form of equation (10) is given by
g(R) = L(R) - R(R) _ o (11)
where L(X) is the load (or stress) parameter and R(X) is
the capacity (or strength) parameter. The probability of
failure PF of the hardware is then defined as
PF = PIg(X) _ O3 (12)
Let f_(x) be the joint probability function of the random
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design variables X i
f_(x) = fXl .... ,xNlXl' .... x N)
Then equation (12) can be written as
p_ = f f_(_) d_
" g(X) _ 0
(13)
(14)
Depending on the complexity of the failure mode and the
data available on the random design variables, the probabi-
lity of failure (or conversely, the reliability) in equation
(14) may be calculated by one of three probabiiistic
structural analysis methods:
• Full distributional approach
• Second moment method
• Numerical techniques, such as Monte Carlo simulation
Computation of the probability of failure from equation
(14) is called the "full distributional" approach since it
requires the joint probability density function of the
random design variables. If the integral in equation (14)
is computed exactly, then the computed probability of
failure is exact. The exact integration, however, is
possible only for limited cases such as certain stress-
strength interference problems per equation (11) (e.g.
Haugen, 1968; Ang and Tang, 1984; Witt, 1985). The second
moment method is an approximate method which does not
require the joint probability density function of the design
4 "..A
variables but reauires, only the f_rst t,_ _e_,_-_ of each
variable (e.g. Ang and Tang, 1984).
A number of SSME components/parts are life-limited due
to LCF, HCF, and cyclic creep. For these failure modes, the
relationship between the design parameters associated with
uncertainty and the hardware life are defined only by
a computer program, e.t., local strain, fatigue life
prediction, finite element stress model, etc. Consequently,
it would be difficult to obtain a closed-form solution for
the full distribution of hardware life. More feasibly, the
probabilistic structural analysis must be based on a
deterministic methodology, by considering the input design
variables to be random rather than deterministic and
propagating the random variables through the structural
analysis via numerical techniques.
Monte Carlo simulation is the most widely-used numeri-
cal technique to construct the failure distribution. While
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to solve virtually any
reliability problem, a major disadvantage of this methodo-
logy has been the expense required to carry-out the neces-
sary computations. Johnson, Maxwell, and Alired (1975),
Johnson and Maxwell (1976), and Maxwell and Johnson, (1977)
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limit the number of simulations required for a complete
structural analysis algorithm by developing an interpolation
function which represents the dependent failure mode
parameter (such as stress or life} as an explicit linear or
nonlinear function of the design parameters. Presently for
selected SSME hardware, Monte Carlo simulation is being
implemented by the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) (1986)
with the complete structural analysis procedures to derive
the probability distributions of the Weibull parameters
(S,n).
For the SSME, probabiilstic structural analysis of the
components/parts should be used as follows:
• To acquire a better understanding of the effects of
uncertainties of the material properties, thermal
environment, etc. on the determination of hardware
life limits.
• To qualitatively assess component/part reliabiiities
when failure data is not available. The qualitative
reiiabilities are then used to prioritize upgrading
the hardware in a decision analysis methodoiog¥ to
establish hardware life limits.
• To calibrate structural analysis procedures with the
failure data. The objective is for the probaoiiistic
structural analysis of a g_,,-- _=41ure mode to
predict the same Weibull distribution of hardware
life as statistically derived from the failure data.
6.0 DECISION ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Because testing at the component/part levels has not
been conducted, the determination of hardware life limits
for the SSME becomes a decision analysis problem. The
decision analysis process should be a cost-benefit analysis
which establishes hardware life limits from the following
sources :
• The validity of hardware llfe limits realized from
the probabilistic structural analysis
• The inherent reliability being achieved by the
maintenance program, inspection procedures, fabrica-
tion procedures, and quality control
Until the component/part reliabilities generated from a
probabilistic structural ana!ysis are verified with reliabi-
lities generated from failure data, the reliability of the
SSME hardware, and hence, the life limits, will have to be
qualified by a maintenance program calibrated to prevent
functional failures from occurring.
The relative part/component reiiabilities, determined
from the probabilistic structurai analysis and aggregated
through the system performance model, can be used to
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prioritize which hardware should be upgraded. The upgrading
of a particular hardware should consider the following
alternatives and the expected costs/benefits:
7.0
• Conduct testing
• To improve information on material properties
• To improve information on the operating
environment
e To improve information on component/part
reliabilities
• Modify the design
• Improve maintenance/inspection procedures
• Improve fabrication procedures
RECOMMENDATIONS
In summary, the following recommendations should be
implemented for the management of SSME hardware life
utiiizarion:
• Identify and define descriptive measures of the
mechanical failure modes of all SSME hardware
for use in maintenance, inspection, and statistical
failure data analysis.
• Develop a mathematical reliability model of the SSME
(e.g. fault tree analysis) from the FMEA/CIL Criticality
Category 1 failures.
• Develop a file of values of the Weibull shape parameter
8 to model the failure distributions of SSME hardware.
• Calibrate failure distributions (Weibull parameters)
developed from probab!!!stlc structural analysis with
failure distributions statistically derived from testing.
• Develop a decision analysis methodology to determine
hardware life limits when failure data is not available
which incorporates the following:
• Expected costs
• Probabiiistic structural analysis
• Maintenance/Inspection procedures
• Fabrication procedures
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Figure 4. Partial conceptual fault tree of SSME. {Ducts, valves,
controller, etc. not shown. Transfer events not
developed.)
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Figure 7. Factor of Safety
vs. Probability
of Failure as a
Function of Shape
Parameter 8 for
the Weibull
Distribution
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7. Conclb_ions
For the controller failure data Weibull Models fits
well. The MTBF assuming censored Weibull Model is 1,##8
hours. If one uses simple Exponential Modelj MTBF is 881.
It is advisable to use censored models which take into
account the time for the units which did not fail. The B1
life using Weibull Model is 197.5 hours.
For SSME blade failures using grouped Weibull Model
MTBF obtained is 27.69 hours. The variances of the
estimators are also obtained for the parameters in MTBF.
The B1 life is 2.16. The drawback of the method is that
to find the estimators one needs to solve two simultaneous
nonlinear equations• Alternatively the randomly placed
model can be used. For this method MTBF is 17.32 hours and
B1 life is 1.5 hours. This method depends on seed numbers
used in the random number generators so it is better to
make number o_ runs with different seed points and average
the results.
Other models like GammaModel may give the better fit
for controller failure data. The maximum likelihood
estimating......... equat _._,,_ _...w_v=_. I.o_ incomplete gamma functions
solving these equations need sophisticated programming
techniques. These problems need further investigation.
I •
.
.
•
.
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TABLE 3
APPLICATIONS OF WEIBULL DISTRIBUTION FOR FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS
(PRELIMINARY LIST)
Application Reference
IBearing failures in a fighter ......... Abernethy, Mediin,
_.4_ _,,,_,_n_ _11vbo_umD: and Ringhiser
Weibul! shape parameter 8 of (1983)
4.615 (final value)
RGenerai classification of Weibull ..... Abernethy, Medlin,
failure modes: and Ringhiser
(1983);
Failure Mode
Infant Mortality ........... <1
Inadequate Burn-in
Green Run
Misassembl 7
Some Quality Problems
Electronics
Abernethy, Breneman,
Medlin, and Reinman
(1983)
Random Failures ............ 1.0
Independent of Time
Maintenance Errors
Electronics
Mixture of Problems
Early Wearout .............. 3.0
Surprise
LCF
Rapid, Old-age Wearout ..... 6.0
Bearings
Corrosion
mRB-211Enqlne
Module
Weibull Shape
Parameter 8
... Biundeil and Beard
(1985)
!.P. Compressor ........ 0.7, 3.08
Intermediate Case ...... 3.068
H.P. Compressor and
Turbine ............ 2.206
I.P. and L.P. Turbine .. 1.355, 3.5
High-Speed External
Gearbox .............. 2.85
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TABLE 3 (CONT'D)
APPLICATION REFERENCE
mTitanium-6-A1-4V alloy .................. Mahorter, London,
engine discs, LCF failures at Fowler and
bolt holes, values of Weibull Salvino (1985);
shape parameter B of 2.0 and 3.2 Mahorter, Fowler,
and Saivino (1985)
BWearout of augmentor hydraulic .......... Medlin and
fuel pumps on fighter aircraft: Elsaesser (1983)
Weibull shape parameter B of 2.6.
Housing cracks of augmentor hy-
draulic fuel pump on fighter aircraft:
Welbull shape parameter B of 2.9
mProbability distribution associated ..... Saizman and
with Weibuli shape parameter 8: Gauger (1986)
Weibuli Sha_?
Distribution Type Parameter 8
Exponential ............... 1.0
Rayleigh .................. 2.0
r.__=l 9 g -- 3,0
Normal .................. 3.0 - 4.0
Small Extreme Value ...... > 10.0
• Weibull distribution used for LCF ....... Sattar and
crack initiation life of gas turbine Sundt (1975)
engine disc
• Air Turbine Starter: .................... Trimble and
Schmidt (1983)
Weibuil Shape
Failure Mode Parameter 8
Ball Bearing Fatigue .......... 2.0
Roller Bearing Fatigue ... ..... 1.5
Bearing Infant Mortality ...... 0.5
Gear Fatigue .................. 2.5
Seal Random Failures .......... 1.0
Seal Infant Mortality .......... 0.5
Clutch Random Failures ........ 1.0
• Application of Weibuli ................... Wirsching (1981);
probability distribution to model Fatigue Reiiabi-
fatigue data. lity: Development
of Criteria for
Design (1982)
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TABLE 4
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POOR QUALITY
METHODS TO DEVELOP WEIBULL SHAPE PARAMETER 6 FILE
i ,
SSMEHARDWARE
From test/flight'dataof engineharuware
a. SSME
b. Other liquid rocket engines which are pump-
propelled (Assumption: Similar operations
and similar component part configurations
should have similar values of 8).
I
• J-2 engine in Saturn Ib and V Vehicles (153)"
• H-1 engine in Saturn Ib vehicle (294)
• F-1 engine in Saturn V vehicle (85)
• RS-27 engine in Delta vehicle (69)
• Thor engine in Thor vehicle (524)
• Atlas engine in Atlas, Atlas-Centaur
vehicles (1110)
• From test data on material specimens of engine
hardware
3. From probabi!istic structural analysis
4. From expert judgment
1Approximate number of engines developed per MacGregor
(1982).
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